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ABSTRACT

This paper focusses on questions such as what determines the societal
level of honesty (that is, the proportion of honest individuals in the economy),
and why some economies may be more honest, or less honest, than others.

A

central feature of our model is that an individual's (Bayesian) behavior
(to be honest or dishonest) is influenced by his own past experiences which,
in turn, are determined by the behavior of others.

Therefore, honesty en

courages honesty, whereas dishonesty encourages dishonesty.

Our formal

analysis is conducted within an overlapping generations framework, in which
individuals live for a finite amount of time, but the society is a going
concern.
We show that there can be dishonesty in an economy even if the young
est generation is entirely honest, and that there can be honesty in an economy
even if the youngest generation is entirely dishonest.

We predict the effects

(on the level of honesty) of parameters representing the characteristics
of individuals and the economy.

For instance, if the youngest generation

believes that the level of honesty in the economy is higher then, indeed,
the actual level of honesty is higher.

In addition, we have been able to

delineate intuitive conditions under which an economy is less honest (or
more honest) if people live longer, and under which older persons are less
honest (or more honest) than the younger ones.

WHAT AFFECTS 1HE LEVEL OF HONESTI IN AN ECONOMY?

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, •••
Shakespeare

Raaj Kumar Sah*
March 1985
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WHAT AFFECTS 1HE LEVEL OF HONES'IY IN AN ECONOMY?

By Raaj Kumar Sah

Social scientists have often grappled with questions such as what
determines the level of honesty in a society, and why one society may be
more honest, or less honest, than another. 1

We present here a model within

which such questions can be posed, and show that economic insights can be of
significant help in ascertaining the answers. 2
The aspect of human behavior which plays a central role in our anal
ysis is that an individual's decision to be honest or dishonest depends,
in part, on his own past experiences.

For instance, if an individual's past

experiences consist primarily of having been treated dishonestly, then he
is likely to believe that there is a preponderance of dishonesty in the
economy.

Further, this belief may induce him to behave dishonestly if it

appears harmful to him to be honest in a seemingly dishonest world.

Thus,

an individual is honest or dishonest in different phases of his life depend
ing on the experiences which the passage of time brings to him, and depending
on the relative costs of being honest versus dishonest.

3

Next, consider the determination of collective honesty.

The main

feature of our model in this regard is that honesty reinforces honesty,
whereas dishonesty reinforces dishonesty.

This is because the beliefs (and

the behavior)_ of each individual are affected by the behavior of others.
Alternatively stated, honest persons generate an externality on others by
making it more desirable for them to be honest.
an opposite externali ty.

Dishonest peTsons generate

We study the properties of the equilibrium where
1

2

these two opposing externalities are in balance with one another.
Our model of individual behavior is consistent with Bayesian optimi
zation.

In addition, it predicts patterns of behavior which have intuitive

appeal.

For instance, an individual changes his behavior (from being honest

to being dishonest, or vice-versa) only if his last experience was in con
tradiction with his beliefs.

We determine the societal level of honesty

(that is, the proportion of honest individuals in the economy) within an
overlapping generations framework, in which each individual Ii ves for a
finite amount of time, but the society lasts forever.
The organization of the paper is as follows.

Rather than beginning

with a general model, we first present a simple example in Section I.

The

main reason for presenting this example is that its simpler context makes
it easier to focus on some of the features of our oodel.

Though this example

is based on a somewhat polar form o.f individuals' behavior, it is consistent
with rationality under certain circumstances.

Section 2 contains the main

model for predicting individuals' behavior and for determining the level
of honesty in the economy.

Results are presented in Section 3.

The last

section contains concluding remarks.

I.

AN EXAMPLE

We employ an overlapping generations framework in which an individual
lives for

n

periods.

n

~

2,

and it is finite.

A new generation enters

the economy in each period, and all generations have the same (large) number
of individuals.

yk

denotes the level of honesty in the

k

th

generation

(that is, the proportion of honest persons among those who have already lived
for

k - 1 periods), and

k = 1, ••• , n.

average level of honesty in the economy is

Clearly,
y

and

1

~

yk

~

0 .

The

3

n
(1)

y =

I Y/n .

k=l

The proportion of honest persons in the youngest generation is
present, we take

y

1

y1 •

At

as an exogenous parameter and show, later, that

whether an individual begins his life as an honest or a dishonest person
can be explained in terms of more fundamental characteristics of indivi
duals.4
In each period, an individual encounters (trades with) another in
di vi dual, and there is an equal probabi 1i ty of encountering any one of the
Thus, the probability that an individual en-

individuals in the economy.
counters an honest person is

y •5

After each period, every individual

reconsiders the choice of his behavior, and decides whether to be honest
or dishonest in the next period.

A wide variety of individuals' behavior

is (endogenously) determined in the next section.

At present, we consider

a specific example in which an initially honest person remains honest as
long as he has encountered only honest persons; and an initially dishonest
person always remains dishonest.

This behavior reflects 'extreme caution'

and, clearly, it is somewhat polar.

But,.as we shall see later, it is con

sistent with rational behavior under certain circumstances.
The level of honesty in the generation

(k + 1)

is therefore given by

(2)

The sum of the above expression from

k = 0

using (1), to yield
n-1
(3)

f(y) - Y1

2
k=O

y

k

- ny = 0 •

to

(n - 1)

can be rearranged,

4

A solution of the above polynomial equation is a steady state equilibrium
level of honesty in the economy.

Substitution of this solution into (2)

yields the level of honesty in various generations. 6
If

y

is a solution of (3), then our interest is in examining its

properties only if it is stable, and if
is important is this.

1

>

y

~

0.

The reason why stability

If the economy starts from an arbitrary disequilib

rium situation, then it converges only to a stable equilibrium.

Alterna~

tively, if the economy is at an equilibrium then, after a small shock, it
returns to this equilibrium only if the equilibrium is stable.

In the pre

sent context, thus, we need not consider an unstable equilibrium.
The condition for stability is easy to obtain.

A solution

y

of

(3) is stable if and only if 7
f (y) < 0 ,
y

(4)

where the subscripts of

f

derivative is being taken.
is as follows.

From (3),

denote the variable with re,::?ect to which a partial
The economic intuition behind the condition (4)
f(y)/n

can be viewed as the difference between

this period's average honesty in the economy and the last period's average
honesty.

This difference must be zero at an equilibrium.

Now, if the

economy is out of equilibrium, and if the above difference is positive
(negative), then stability requires that the corresponding difference in
the next period should be smaller (larger) than that in this period.

But,

this can happen if and only if (4) is satisfied.
It is instructive to look at some features of the equilibrium.

First

consider the case in which the youngest generation has honest as well as
dishonest persons, that is,
and

f(l)

<

0.

1

>

y

1

>

0 •

Then (3) shows that

f(O)

>

0,

Therefore, there must be at least one internal equilibrium

5

(that is, the corresponding

y

is greater than zero but smaller than one),

which is stable.

In the present case, it turns out that this is the only
8
.
stabl e equ1·1·b
1 r1um.
A more important result is obtained in the case in which the young

est generation is entirely honest, that is,
can be shown that if n
. is
. interna.
.
l 10
an d it

~

y

1

= 1 •

9

In this case, it

then there is a unique stable equilibrium,

4 ,

If individuals live for four or more periods,

Thus:

and if the youngest generation is entirely honest,· then there must be some
dishonesty in the economy.
This result may appear counterintuitive at first slght because, with
a completely honest generation entering the economy in each period, one
would expect that the economy would eventually become entirely honest.

To

see why this is not true, consider a disequilibrium situation in which there
is a very small nwnber of dishonest persons (say a dozen out of a million)
in the economy.

These dishonest persons, handful though they are, generate

an externali ty in each period, and make other persons dishonest who, in
turn, do the same.

This process continues until the stable equilibrium,

entailing some dishonesty in the economy, is attained.
Furthermore, there is an intuitive reason why the above result holds
only if individuals' life span is four or more periods.

If individuals live

longer, then even a small number of dishonest persons have a greater poten
tial for spreading dishonesty.

Conversely, if the individuals' life span

is short, say only two periods, then dishonesty becomes extinct before it
acquires a permanent base in the economy.
We now turn to comparative statics analysis.

If

e

denotes an exog

enous parameter, then it is obvious from (3) and (4) that the sign of
is the same as the sign of

f

8

•

Now,

3£/ay 1 > 0 ,

from (3).

dy/de

We therefore

6

obtain the following result which, as we shall see, holds also for the gen
eral model presented in the next section.
PROPOSITION 1:

The economy-wide level of honesty is lower if the level of

honesty in the youngest generation is lower.
The reason for this result is simple.
direct effect of reducing the average.

A lower initial honesty has a

In addition, it increases the inci

dence of those experiences in which individuals encounter dishonest persons.
The indirect effect, therefore, also leads to a reduction in the economy-wide
honesty.
The effect of an increase in the life span of individuals can be ascertained from (3), which yields

n-1

f(y, n+l) -f(y, n) = -y(l-y 1y

)

Thus, the economy's level of honesty declines if people live longer.

<

0.

This

is because the individuals' behavior in the present example is such that an
older generation is less honest and, in fact, the oldest generation is the
least honest of all generations.

A longer life span, therefore, lowers the

average honesty in the economy, and also creates a negative externality.
The above comparative statics results are depicted in Figure 1.

Note,

however, that the present result concerning the effect of individual's life
span is, in part, due to the extreme caution underlying the individuals'
behavior.

This result is modified, and indeed it is less pessimistic, when

more general forms of behavior are considered, to which we now turn.

Figure 1

y 1 is the proportion.
of honest persons in
the youngest generation.

The proportion of
honest persons in
the economy, y.

Yi= 1
~-------------- y 1

2

<1

3
The life span of individuals , n.

7

II •

TI-IE MODEL

We begin with a model of individual behavior which is not only con
sistent with individual (Bayesian) optimization, but which also predicts.
appealing behavioral patterns.

Individuals begin their lives with differ

ent beliefs (priors) concerning the extent of honesty in the economy, and
these differences influence whether an individual begins his life as an
honest or a dishonest person.
superscripts
An

i = 1

Denote these two types of individuals by the

and 2, respectively.

individual revises his beliefs in each period based on his past

experiences, and chooses his behavior (to be honest or dishonest) depending
on what he considers to be best for himself.

mik

denotes the mean estimate

of the level of honesty in the economy, which an individual of type
when he has lived for

k

periods.

i

makes

ik
We discuss the determination of m

below, but before that we look at the choice faced by an individual.
Individual Choice:
is determined as follows.

an (expected) utility
Ugb

Ugg

In any single period, an honest person receives
if he encounters an honest person, and utility

if he encounters a dishonest person.

responding utilities are
Ugg

The relative cost of being honest versus dishonest

>

Ugb.

Ubg

and

Ubb •

For a dishonest person, the cor
We assume

Ubb

>

ugb,

and

That is, being dishonest is better if one encounters a dishonest

person, but being honest is better if one encounters an honest person.

The

individual must, however, choose his behavior before the actual encounter.
It follows than that an individual of type
period
(5)

(k + 1)

of his life if

ik >

m

i

U

. d.is h onest ot h erw1se.
.
ll
an d 1s

In (5), we have defined

is honest in the

8

one would expect,

U can be viewed as a summary parameter representing the

relative cost (in terms of utilities) of being honest versus being dishonest.

12

It is this summary parameter which we shall use in the rest of

the paper.
Two aspects of the individual's choice should be noted here.

First,

the decision criterion (5) shows that an individual's choice depends on the
mean of his priors concerning the level of honesty in the economy, but not
Second, we have assumed that, in deter

on the distribution of his priors.

mining his behavior, an individual believes that his own choice to be honest
or dishonest does not affect the level of honesty in the economy.

This

assumption is justified in the present context in which the number of in
dividuals in the economy is large.
The total number of honest persons which an

Individual's Beliefs:

individual encounters during his
tribution.

k

past periods is clearly a binomial dis

We assume that the initial priors of an individual (concerning the

level of honesty in the economy) are distributed according to a beta distribution with parameters

i
i
• 13 Therefore, a standard result in
w)
(u,

statistics 14 allows us to express

ik = ui
ui

(6)

where

m

si(k)

+

+

i

as

(k)

wi

+

k

is the number (score) of honest persons which this individual

has encountered during the

k

past periods.

By substituting (6) into (5),

we can express an individual's decision criterion in terms of his initial
beliefs and his past experiences.
Now recall that we had defined individuals of type

i

=

1

and 2 to

9

From (5),

be respectively those who are initially honest and dishonest.
this means:

10

m

~u,

and

20

m

< U •

From (6), therefore, the above

definition can be equivalently expressed as

u

(7)

1

1
u1 + w

>

u , and

u

2

2
u2 + w

<

u •

y 1 is simply the proportion of individuals who have
15
initial beliefs specified by the first part of expression (7).
It follows then that

Properties

of

lndi viduals Behavior:

The decision criterion (5) can

be expressed in a much simpler form by defining

(8)

as the reservation level for being honest.

From (5) and (6), then, an.in

dividual's decision to be honest or dishonest in the period

(k

+ l)

of his

life is determined by the following decision rule.

Be honest if si(k)

(9)

>

ci(k) ,

and be dishonest otherwise.

individual thus determines his optimal behavior in each period by simply

An

comparing the score of honest persons he has encountered in the past to the
reservation level for that period.

The decision rule is clearly parsimonious

in the use of memory.
A useful feature of the above model is that it is capable of generat
ing a wide variety of individuals' behavior, depending on the parameters
i

i

(u, w , U)

representing initial beliefs and the relative cost of alterna-

tive behaviors.

Furthermore, the model predicts patterns of behavior which

have attractive properties.

Some of these properties are described below;

particularly those which will be helpful in deriving the results in the next
section.
First: An individual changes his behavior (from being honest to dis
honest, or vice-versa) only if his last experience has contradicted his belief.
To see this, note that if an individual was honest in the last period, and
if his last encounter was with an honest person, then he remains honest in
this period.

This is because if si (k - 1) > ci (k - 1) ,

i(k) = si(k - 1)

+

1

then, from (8),

si(k) > ci(k) •

and if
A parallel argument

shows that a person remains dishonest if he was dishonest in the last period
and if he encountered a dishonest person.

Therefore, a necessary condition

for a change in an individual's behavior is that his last experience should
be in contradiction with his beliefs.
Second, it is obvious from (8) that the reservation level is higher
for an older person, that is

(10)

Third, expressions (7) and (8) yield

(11)

c 2 (k)

>

c 1 (k) •

In other words, the reservation level for an initially dishonest person is
higher, at any stage in his life, than the corresponding reservation level
for an initially honest person.
Finally, the effects of exogenous parameters on reservation levels
can be seen directly from (8).

( 12)

They are

and

for

any

k •

11

Now, note from (7) that a smaller ui
miO •16 From

(.12),

or a larger

implies a smaller

wi

therefo re, the reservat ion level is higher for efther type

of individu al if he initiall y believes that the level of honesty in the
or if the relative cost of honesty is higher.

economy is lower,

All of

the above propert ies are clearly in agreeme nt with what we would expect the
nature of human behavio r to be.
The Level of Honesty in the Economy:
of type

i

The proport ion of individu als

who are honest in the generati on

k

is the probabi lity of

This, in turn, is the probabi lity of

(9) being satisfie d.

successe s in

(k + 1)

indepen dent Bernoul li trials, where

of success in each trial.

y

ci(k)

or more

is the probabi lity
Ci (k)

To calculat e these probab ilities, we use

to denote integer valued reserva tion score correspo nding to (8). Specifi cally,
Ci(k)

equals

ci(k)

if the latter is an integer, and

number which is the closest higher integer to

i

(k) ,

Ci(k)

equals the

otherwi se.

The

decision rule (9) now implies that an individu al is honest in generati on
(k +l)

if si(k) ~ Ci(k) •

The correspo nding probabi lity can be calculat ed

from binomia l distribu tion; we denote this probabi lity as

Bi(k) ,

where

17

(13)

Therefo re, the proport ion of honest individu als in generati on

(k + 1)

is
(14)

Using (1), the

sum

rearrang ed to yield

of the above expressi on from

k = 1 to

(n - 1)

can be

12

f(y)

(15)

As

before, a solution of the above polynomial

equation is a steady-state

equilibrium level of honesty in the economy, and an equilibrium is stable
if and only if it satisfies (4) • 18

Also, the existence of equilibrium can

be studied by using techniques parallel to those used in Section I.
instance, if y 1 is internal, that is
f(0)

>

0

and

f(l) < 0.

1 > y

1

>

0,

For

then (15) yields:

Therefore, corner equilibria (that is

y = 0

or 1} are not possible, and at least one stable internal equilibrium must
exist.

This, in turn, has an implication which we would intui_tively expect:

If the youngest generation contains both honest and dishonest persons, then
the economy can not be entirely honest or entirely dishonest.
It would be useful here to demonstrate our earlier claim that the
example in Section I is a special case of the present model.
note.that if

c1 (k) = k ,

B1 (k)

and

= yk ,

special case (3).

B2 (k)

and

=0

•

c2 (k)

>

k ,

To see this,

then (13) implies:

Substitution of these into (15) yields the

Further, the above reservation scores can be shown to be

optimal for many sets of parameters

(ui, wi, U) ;

which the relative cost of honesty,

U,

particularly those in

is high and the initial beliefs

are such that 'extreme caution' is the rational behavior. 19

III.

RESULTS

Our objective in this section is to derive some of the important prop
erties of the level of honesty in the economy.

We first examine whether

there can be dishonesty (honesty) in an economy if the youngest generation
is entirely honest (dishonest).
when

Clearly, the answer is yes, because, even

is zero or one, there would be many different sets of parameters

13

for which the equation (15) has an internal stable solution.

we have already provided an example in which
rium is internal.

y

In Section I,

is one, but the equilib

1

We now present an example in which

y

1

is zero, but the

equilibrium is internal.
Consider the case in which an initially honest person remains honest
throughout his life, and an initially dishonest person becomes honest, and
remains so, if he encounters at least one honest person.
2

C (k) = 1 •

vation scores are:

That is, the reser-

These scores exhibit

'very little caution' and they can, once again, be shown to be optimal for
many sets of parameters, particularly those where the relative cost of
honesty,

.

u ,

15

l ow. 20

2
·
B (k) = 1 -

From (13), therefore,

stituting this into (15) and setting

y

1

(1 - y)

k

Sub-

•

at zero, it can be verified that:

If the youngest generation is entirely dishonest, then the unique stable
equilibrium entails some honesty in the economy, provided individuals live
for four or more periods. 21

The reason for this counterintuitive result is

parallel to the one explained in Section I.
Obviously, the above example and the one presented earlier in Section
I are particular illustrations of the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2:

There can be dishonesty in an economy even if the youngest

generation is entirely honest, and there can be honesty in an economy even
if the youngest generation is entirely dishonest.
The level of honesty in the present model depends on the parameters
i wi , U, n) •
(y , u,
1
of

dy/de

For comparative statics analysis, recall that the sign

is the same as that of
n

Now,

af/ay

1

= 1 +

from (11), and

l

where

fe

1
2
[B (k) - B (k)] ,

9

is an exogenous parameter.

from (15).

Further,

k=l
Bi

is decreasing in

Ci

from (13).

Hence,

C2 (k)

>

C1 (k) ,

14

2
1
B (k) ~B (k) ,

and

the present model.

af/ay 1 >0. Clearly, therefore, Proposition 1 holds in
The reason for this is simple.

An initially dishonest

person is no more likely to be honest (at any stage in life) than an ini
tially honest person.

A lower level of initial honesty thus not only lowers

the economy's average, but it may also decrease the level of honesty in the
older generations.

Both of these effects, in turn, have externali ty which

lowers the level of honesty.
Next, recall from (12) that the reservation level ci (k) is smaller if
ui

is larger.

decreases.
Thus

As a consequence, either

Correspondingly, either

af/aui ~ 0.

fu.:: 0.

An

Ci(k)

Bi(k)

remains unchanged, or it

remains unchanged, or it increases.

exactly parallel argument shows that

af/awi

<

O and

These yield the following result.

PROPOSITION 3:

The level of honesty in the economy is nondecreasing in the

initial beliefs of individuals concerning the economy's level of honesty,
and it is nonincreasing in the relative cost of honesty.
A stronger result is obtained if the reservation score is affected by
the parameters for either type of individuals in at least one generation.
In this highly plausible case: A higher (lower) initial prior or a lower
(higher) relative cost of honesty must raise (lower) the economy's level of
honesty.

The result is quite intuitive.

If the youngest generation (of

either type of individuals) believes that the level of honesty in the econo~y
is higher then they can not be less honest at any stage in their life.
Further, if this belief makes them more honest in even one generation (which
is what we would normally expect) then, clearly, the belief has a direct
as well as an indirect effect of raising the level of honesty in the

econo □y.

The effect of a higher (or a lower) relative cost of honesty can be understood

15

similarly.
To assess the implications of the individuals' life span, we·use (15)
f(n +l, y) - f(n, y) = y B1 (n) + (l-y )B 2 (n) - Y,
1
1
following result.
to obtain

PROPOSITION 4:

and note the

A longer life span of individuals lowers (raises) the level

of honesty in the economy if

( 16)

is negative (positive).
This proposition has a straightforward meaning.

If, at present, the

level of honesty in the oldest generation is lower (higher) than that in
the economy, then a longer life span lowers (raises) the economy's level of
honesty.

Whether (16) is negative or positive depends, in turn, on whether

the reservation scores are high or low.

This can be seen by looking at (13).

If the reservation scores are high then B's are small (closer to zero) and
( 16) would be negative.
then
tive.

B's

On the other hand, if the reservation scores are low,

are large (closer to one) and the expression (16) would be posi

Now, recall our earlier discussion of the determinants of the reser

vation scores.

In a qualitative sense, then, an increased life span of in

dividuals lowers (raises) the level of honesty if the initial priors are
small (large) and if the relative cost of honesty is large (small).
We finally delineate the conditions under which an older generation
is less (or more) honest than its younger generation.
on the sign of

Yk+l - yk •

This depends directly

Using (14), we obtain the following result.

16

PROPOSITION 5:
k th

The

(k

+

l) st

generation is less (more) honest than the

.
.f
generation
1.

{17)

is negative (positive) •
• The qualitative implication of this proposition is that the effect
of age on the honesty level of a generation depends solely on whether the
older generation's reservation scores are higher than or equal to that of the
succeeding generation.
the age increases

ci(k)

Ci (k) = Ci (k - 1)

or

Bi (k) > Bi (k - 1)

To see this, note from (8) that a unit increase in
by less than one.
Ci (k) = Ci (k - 1)

+

As a consequence:

1

either

In the former case,

because if two successive generations have the same reser

vation scores, then the older generation must be more honest. In the latter
case, on the other hand,

Bi (k) < Bi (k - 1)

because if both the reservation

score

as well as the age increase by one, then the probability of meeting
the reservation score is lower.22 Thus, if the reservation scores of both types

of individuals increase (remain unchanged) with the passage of a period,
then they are more (less) dishonest than their younger generation.

The

effect of age on honesty is ambiguous, in general, in the intermediate case
in which the reservation score increases for one type of person but nor for
the other type.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

There has been an increasing awareness in the literature of the pos
sible effects of dishonesty, opportunism and other similar forms of human.
behavior on the level of economic activity.

It is then natural to ask ques

tions such as what determines the level of honesty in a society, and why
one society may be less honest, or more honest, than another.

In this paper,

we have presented an economic model within which these questions can be
posed and analyzed.
Our model is based on some of the most natural ways of thinking about
individuals' decisions to be honest versus dishonest, and about the collective
determination of honesty in society.

An individual is honest or dishonest

in different phases in his life depending, .in part, on his own past experi
ences (that is, on how much honesty and dishonesty has been done to him in
the past) •

Furth er, each person's experiences are determined by the behavior

of others.

At the societal level, therefore, honesty encourages honesty,

whereas dishonesty encourages dishonesty.

Our model not only admits these

ideas, but also allows us to investigate how the societal level of honesty
is influenced by the characteristics of individuals and the economy.

The

formal model presented in this paper is, of course, not the most general
model that one can construct but, I believe, it provides a potentially
fruitful direction for further extensions and concomitant qualifications.
We have shown that if the youngest generation believes that the level
of honesty is higher in the society then, indeed, the actual level of honesty
in the society is higher.

But, at the same time, there can be dishonesty

in the society even if the youngest generation is entirely honest, and there
can be honesty in the society even if the youngest generation is entirely
dishonest.

In addition, we have delineated intuitive conditions under which
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the society is less honest (or more honest) if people live longer, and under
which the older persons are less honest (or more honest) than the younger
ones.

APPENDIX 1
y

Here we show that
if

fy(y)

<

0.

is a stable solution to (3) or (15) if and only

The proof applies both to the example in Section I, as well

as to the model in Section II.
B1 (k)

= yk,

and

B2

= 0.
t •

Time is denoted by
eration k

is

For the former case, simply substitute:

At time

the level of honesty in gen

t,

and the economy-wide level of honesty is

yk(t) ,

If the economy begins with arbitrary numbers for
it can be verified that for

ny(t +l) = y 1 + y 1 I
k=l

Now, define a fwiction
f(y(t)) + ny(t) •
(19)

f

y 2 (0), ••• , yn(O) ,

then

t > n- 1
n-1

(18)

y(t) •

B1 (k, y(t)) + (l-y 1)

n-1

I

2
B (k, y(t)) •

k=l

such that the right hand side of (18) equals

Therefore, the equation of motion is

y(t + 1) = y(t) + f(y(t))/n

Clearly, the steady state,

requires that

y(t + 1) = y(t) ,

f(y) = 0 •

This is what we have used in the text.
The stability properties can be examined in Figure 2.
are those points where

y(t +l)

Steady states
By inspec

intersects the 45 degree line.

tion, it follows that a steady state is stable (unstable) if
intersects the 45 degree line from above (below).
steady state for (19) if and only if

fy(y)

<

0.

Therefore,

y(t + 1)
y

is a stable

The same conclusion can

also be reached by using more sophisticated arguments, for example, those
outlined by Michael Safanov (1980), but they are not needed in the present
simple case.
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Figure 2

y(t + 1)

y(t)

Only those steady states are stable
where y(t + 1) intersects the 45-degree
line from above.

FOOTNOTES

1.

I use the word honesty in a generic sense, without distinguishing it
from other expressions such as trust, guilelessness, truthfulness,
low opportunism, etc.

2.

The potential consequences of dishonesty have been increasingly studied
in the economics literature.

Oliver Williamson (1985) has succintly

argued that a higher opportunism increases transaction costs which, in
turn, victimize many transactions which would have otherwise taken place.
Thus, the level of economic activity may be reduced.
Arrow (1974, p. 23) on this issue.

Also, see Kenneth

The focus of this paper, however,

is not on the consequences of honesty, but on what determines societal
honesty. ,_
3.

This view parallels some aspects of the functional theory of learning.
See Ernest Hilgrad and Gordon Bower (1966) for a review of this and
other theories of learning.

4.

We do not, however, go into the ultimate determinants of individuals'
characteristics.

This is in keeping with a standard economic approach

in which the individuals' characteristics are parametrically specified,
and their effects on the economy-wide variables are determined.
5.

This involves a slight simplification.

If N is the number of persons

in a generation, then an honest person encounters an honest person with
a probability

(nNy - 1)/ (nN - 1) ,

an honest person with a probability

and a dishonest person encounters
nNy/ (nN - 1) •

But since

large, both of these probabilities are nearly equal to
assume that

N is an even number and, therefore,

of pairs in the economy.
20

nN/2

y.

N is
Also, we

is the number
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6.

The calculation of the equilibrium level of dishonesty (that is, the
proportion of dishonest persons in the economy) is straightfOTWard.
If

is the level of dishonesty in generation

bk

then

k ,

b = 1 - y.

and the economy-wide level of dishonesty is
7.

See Appendix 1.

8.

To see this, note that the polynomial equation (3) has two positive
solutions because

f

changes sign twice.

yk

bk= 1

Also,

for one solution, and positive for the other.

must be negative

fy

The latter solution is,

therefore, unstable.
9.

The case in which the youngest generation is completely honest can not
be usefully analyzed within the present simple example.

We examine

this case in the next section.
10.

With

y

1

= 1 ,

the expression (3) yields

fy(l) = n(n - 3)/2 •

There are two positive solutions of (3) and,

y = 1 is one of them.

clearly,
This means

y = 1

and

f(l) = 0,

f(O) > 0,

But if n > 4,

then

f (1)
y

>

0

is an unstable solution, and also that the other

solution is internal and stable.
11.

We assume that an individual chooses to be honest if he is indifferent
between being honest and dishonest.

:'__ :: 12.

this is because

U is increasing in

(Ubb - Ugb) ,

Also, note that the bounds on

and it is decreas
U rule out those

cases in which every type of individual remains either honest or dis
honest, throughout his life, regardless of his beliefs and past experiences.
13.

ui

and

wi

can take any positive values.
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14.

See DeGroot (1970, p. 160) and Rao (1973, p. 335).

15.

The assumptio n that individua ls can have only two kinds of initial be
Our qualitati ve

liefs has been made solely for expositio nal ease.

results remain unchanged if, instead, a continuum of initial beliefs
among individua ls is posited.
16.

For brevity, the effect of a simultane ous change in

ui

on the

and wi

reservati on level and its consequen ces, in turn, on the level of honesty
in the economy is not discussed in this paper.
17.

It is obvious that
Ci (k)

18.

>

Bi (k)

=1

if

ci (k) < 0 ,

and

Bi (k)

=0

if

k •
This should not be

Clearly, there may be multiple stable equilibri a.

surprisin g because a multiplic ity of equilibri a is a conunon feature of
problems dealing with economy-wide determina tions.

Two identical econo

mies can, therefore , have different levels of honesty.

Also, a compari

son of the honesty levels between two different economies can not always
be translate d into
acteristi cs.
n/2 •

possible differenc es in their respectiv e char-

The number of stable equilibri a, however, can not exceed

To see this, note that (15) can not have more than

(n - 1)

solutions ,because the highest possible order of the polynomia l
(n -1) •

f

Further, by plotting

against y ,

f

is

it can be observed

that stable and unstable solutions alternate in the present problem.
Therefore , the number of stable equilibri a can not exceed
19.

n/2 •

For example, consider the following sets of parameter s: U = (on -1)/on ,
2
2
2
1
u = o(o-l)n , wl = (o - l)n , and w = (u +n)/(on- 1) , for any
1
2
Then ( 8) yields: k > c (k) > k - 1 ,
0 > 1 , u > 0 , and n > 2
2
1
2
Therefore , c (k) = k , and c (k) > k
and c (k) > k

.

.

.
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20.

For instance, consider:

n > 2

.

C1 (k)

~ 0 ,

= 0 ,

f(l)

< 0 ,

and

f(y)

has two solutions for which

cS >

>

n-1

y

fy(O) > 0.

<

1 ,

Thus,

and

y = 0

=

y = 0

0

,
is viewed

f

Hence,

is one of them.

f
But

is an unstable solution

then

if n

and the only stable solution is internal.

4,

k

then it changes sign twice.

and
Thus,

0 •

=n(l -y) - I o - y)

if n > 4,
>

,

1

k=O
fy(O) = n(n - 3) /2 • Now, if

(1-y) ,

as a polynomial in

22.

1 + n) / (on - I) ,

,

In this example, (15) yields:
f(O)

(w

and w2 = onu 2 , for any WI > 0 ,
2
1
Then from (8), c (k) < 0 , and 1 > c (k)
and c2 (k) = 1 .

u 2 = (c - l)n

21.

u1 =

U = I/on

This and the last assertion follow from the standard properties of binomial distribution.

Define

B(C, k, y) =

k-.
j)YJ (1 - y) J
i (k\..

,

where

J

j = C, ••• , k •
and

Then it can be verified that:

B(C + 1, k, y) < B(C, k - 1, y) •

B(C, k, y)

>

B(C, k - l, y) ,
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